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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 2011 session, the Virginia General Assembly passed
House Bill 2358, Benefit Corporations, to be codified as article 22
(the "Benefit Corporations Article") of the Virginia Stock Corpora-
tion Act ("VSCA").' The Benefit Corporations Article is largely
based on legislation prepared in other states2 and allows a Virgin-
ia corporation to elect in its articles of incorporation to be treated
as a "benefit corporation." These for-profit corporations are re-
quired to pursue not only profitability but also a general public
benefit and, if one so elects, one or more specific public benefits.
In Section II of this article, the author discusses the Benefit Cor-
porations Article in detail. Section III examines some aspects of
the Benefit Corporations Article for social entrepreneurs and
practitioners to consider before making the benefit corporation
election. In Section IV, the author asks whether practitioners and
social entrepreneurs can achieve some of the same corporate gov-
ernance objectives by private ordering without electing to be
treated as benefit corporations. Finally, Section V concludes with
some observations about the Benefit Corporations Article itself.
* Partner, Williams Mullen, Richmond, Virginia; J.D., 2003, University of Richmond
School of Law; M.B.A., 2003, The Robins School of Business, University of Richmond; B.A.,
1995, University of Virginia.
1. Act of Mar. 26, 2011, ch. 698, 2011 Va. Acts _ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§
13.1-782 to -791 (Repl. Vol. 2011)).
2. See Passed Benefit Corporation Legislation, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/
publicpolicy (last visited Oct. 12, 2011); see also Bus. Ass'n Comm. of the Section of Bus.
Law of the Pa. Bar Ass'n, Amendments to the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes with
Official Source Notes and Committee Comments: Adopting Provisions Relating to the In-
corporation and Governance of Benefit Corporations as Chapter 33 of Title 15 § 3302 [here-
inafter Proposed Pennsylvania Act], available at http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/
bcorp/documents/DraftPennsylvania-Legislation.pdf; Jamie Raskin, The Rise of Benefit
Corporations, THE NATION, June 27, 2011, www.thenation.com/article/161261/rise-benefit-
corporations.
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II. THE BENEFIT CORPORATIONS ARTICLE AMENDMENT TO THE
VIRGINIA STOCK CORPORATION ACT
A. Formation
Under the newly enacted Benefit Corporations Article, a bene-
fit corporation is "a corporation organized pursuant to the provi-
sions of [VSCA]: (1) [t]hat has elected to become subject to [the
Benefit Corporations Article]; and (2) [t]he status of which as a
benefit corporation has not been terminated under § 13.1-786."'
To organize itself as a benefit corporation, a Virginia corporation
must state in its articles of incorporation, either at the time it is
formed or by a subsequent amendment, that it is a benefit corpo-
ration.' In addition, the corporation must state in its articles of
incorporation that it was organized for "the purpose of creating a
general public benefit," and it may state one or more specific pub-
lic benefits in either its articles of incorporation or bylaws.'
B. Public Benefit
The general public benefit that each Virginia benefit corpora-
tion must pursue is defined as "a material positive impact on so-
ciety and the environment taken as a whole, as measured by a
third-party standard, from the business and operations of a bene-
fit corporation."' A specific public benefit means:
[A] benefit that serves one or more public welfare, religious, charita-
ble, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or other purpose or
benefit beyond the strict interest of the shareholders of the benefit
corporation, including:
1. Providing low-income or underserved individuals or commu-
nities with beneficial products or services;
2. Promoting economic opportunity for individuals or commu-
nities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of busi-
ness;
3. Preserving or improving the environment;
4. Improving human health;
5. Promoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of knowledge;
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
4. Id. §§ 13.1-784 to -785 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
5. Id. § 13.1-787 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
6. Id. § 13.1-782 (Repl. Vol. 2011) (emphasis added).
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6. Increasing the flow of capital to entities with a public benefit
purpose; and
7. Conferring any other particular benefit on society or the en-
vironment.7
A benefit corporation's performance and discharge of its mandate
must be measured by a third-party standard, defined as:
[A] recognized standard for defining, reporting, and assessing corpo-
rate social and environmental performance that:
1. Is developed by a person that is independent of the benefit
corporation; and
2. Is transparent because the following information about the
standard is publicly available:
a. The factors considered when measuring the perfor-
mance of a business;
b. The relative weightings of those factors; and
c. The identity of the persons that develop and control
changes to the standard and the process by which those
changes are made.8
So far, Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Vermont have
passed similar benefit corporation statutes,' while Pennsylvaniao
and California have considered a variation of the statute.
C. Fiduciary Duties and Limitation of Liability
Perhaps the most important changes under the Benefit Corpo-
rations Article are the changes to the standard of conduct for di-
rectors and the limitation of liability for officers. The standard of
conduct for directors is codified at section 13.1-788 as follows:
A. Subject to § 13.1-690, in discharging the duties of their respective
positions and in considering the best interests of the benefit corpora-
tion, the board of directors, committees of the board, and individual
directors of a benefit corporation:
1. Shall consider the effects of any corporate action upon:
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Raskin, supra note 2.
10. See generally Proposed Pennsylvania Act, supra note 2.
11. John Tozzi, Maryland Passes 'Benefit Corp.' Law for Social Entrepreneurs,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/runn
ingsmallbusinessarchives/2010/04/benefit crpbi.html.
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a. The shareholders of the benefit corporation;
b. The employees and workforce of the benefit corpora-
tion, its subsidiaries, and suppliers;
c. The interests of customers as beneficiaries of the gen-
eral or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit cor-
poration;
d. Community and societal considerations, including
those of each community in which offices or facilities of
the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or suppliers are
located;
e. The local and global environment;
f. The short-term and long-term interests of the benefit
corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the
benefit corporation from its long-term plans and the pos-
sibility that these interests and the general and specific
public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation may be
best served by the continued independence of the benefit
corporation; and
g. The ability of the benefit corporation to accomplish its
general and any specific public benefit purpose;
2. May consider:
a. The resources; intent; and past, stated, and potential
conduct of any person seeking to acquire control of the
benefit corporation; and
b. Other pertinent factors or the interests of any other
person that they deem appropriate; and
3. Need not give priority to the interests of a particular person
referred to in subdivisions 1 and 2 over the interests of any
other person unless the benefit corporation has stated its in-
tention to give priority to interests related to a specific public
benefit purpose identified in its articles.
B. The consideration of interests and factors in the manner required
by subsection A shall not constitute a violation of § 13.1-690 or a di-
rector conflict of interests under § 13.1-691.12
These provisions are intended to allow a benefit corporation to
pursue its general and specific public benefit purposes without
the restrictions that the default standard of conduct under section
13.1-690 of the VSCA may impose.1 3
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(A)-(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
13. See id. § 13.1-788(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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D. Limitation of Liability
The liability of directors of a benefit corporation is limited as
follows:
C. In any proceeding brought by or in the right of a benefit corpora-
tion or brought by or on behalf of the shareholders of a benefit corpo-
ration, a director is not personally liable for monetary damages for:
1. Any action taken as a director if the director performed the
duties of office in compliance with § 13.1-690 and this section;
or
2. Failure of the benefit corporation to create general public
benefit or any specific public benefit specified in its articles of
incorporation or bylaws or otherwise adopted by the board of
directors. 14
In addition, the liability of officers, but not directors, of a bene-
fit corporation is limited by the following language of the Benefit
Corporations Article codified at section 13.1-789 of the VSCA:
An officer of a benefit corporation shall have no liability for actions
taken that the officer believes, in his good faith business judgment,
are consistent with (i) the general public benefit or specific public
benefit specified in the articles of incorporation or bylaws or other-
wise adopted by the board of directors and (ii) the requirements of
any third-party standard then in effect for the corporation.15
E. Right of Action
The duties of directors and officers under the Benefit Corpora-
tions Article, the requirement to prepare and make available an
annual benefit report, and the obligation to the general and spe-
cific public benefit may only be enforced in a benefit enforcement
proceeding.16 This proceeding is intended to displace the tradi-
tional direct action by the corporation or the traditional deriva-
tive proceeding as the right of action for offenses under the Bene-
fit Corporations Article, but not under the rest of the VSCA."
Only the benefit or other persons specified in the benefit corpora-
14. Id. § 13.1-788(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
15. Id. § 13.1-789 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
16. Id. § 13.1-790(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
17. See id.
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tion's articles or bylaws have standing to bring a benefit enforce-
ment proceeding."s
F. Benefit Report
A Virginia benefit corporation must prepare an annual benefit
report.1 9 That report is a yearly obligation and must be made
available to shareholders within 120 days of the end of the benefit
corporation's fiscal year.2 0 The annual benefit report must de-
scribe how, during the preceding fiscal year: (i) the benefit corpo-
ration created a general public benefit; (ii) how the benefit corpo-
ration pursued its specific public benefit, if any, and if any such
specific public benefit was created; and (iii) any circumstances
hindering the creation of a general public benefit or its specific
public benefit.2 1 In addition, the annual benefit report must in-
clude an assessment of the social and environmental performance
of the benefit corporation prepared in accordance with the third-
party standard identified in the benefit corporation's articles of
incorporation, bylaws, or otherwise adopted by the board of direc-
tors, and the application of that standard should be consistent
with prior annual reports. 22 The annual benefit report should in-
clude any other information required by the third-party standard
and explain any inconsistent application of the third-party stand-
ard.23
G. Effect on Other Virginia Corporations
The Benefit Corporations Article is very clear that it is only in-
tended to apply to corporations electing to be treated as benefit
corporations and should not be read to impose the obligations of a
benefit corporation on other Virginia corporations.2 4
18. Id. § 13.1-790(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
19. Id. § 13.1-791(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
20. Id. § 13.1-791(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
21. Id. § 13.1-791(A) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
22. Id. § 13.1-791(A)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 13.1-783 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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III. CERTAIN CONSIDERATIONS FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS AND
PRACTITIONERS UNDER THE BENEFIT CORPORATIONS ARTICLE
As discussed below, practitioners and social entrepreneurs con-
sidering forming a Virginia benefit corporation should consider
the intended corporate purpose, the fiduciary duty issues that
may arise, issues surrounding officer and director exculpation, is-
sues in initiating a benefit enforcement proceeding, the third-
party standard, and the annual benefit report.
A. Purpose
The specific public benefits enumerated in the Benefit Corpora-
tions Article overlap with the permissible purposes of § 501(c)(3)
not-for-profit corporations.2 5 For example, it is not difficult to
think of not-for-profit enterprises that operate in Virginia that
serve each of these purposes: housing authorities, environmental
organizations like the nature conservancy, not-for-profit hospi-
tals, educational institutions, and arts foundations, and economic
development authorities. There are certainly organizations like
the United Way that help increase the flow of capital to other
worthy organizations that provide a public benefit. A benefit cor-
poration, however, will presumably be taxed at the entity level as
a subchapter C corporation under the Internal Revenue Code, un-
less it is eligible to make the election under subchapter S. The
benefit corporation would also be able to make distributions to
shareholders, unlike a § 501(c)(3) entity.2 6 A party seeking to es-
tablish a corporation with a laudable public purpose in mind
25. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a not-for-profit corporation may be organized
for the following purposes:
(3) [clorporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public
safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the
provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty
to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the ben-
efit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activi-
ties of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which does
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any can-
didate for public office.
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
26. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-653 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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should carefully consider whether a § 501(c)(3) or a benefit corpo-
ration is the proper avenue to pursue.
Further, under section 13.1-671.1 of VSCA, private corpora-
tions may still adopt in their articles, bylaws, or in a shareholder
agreement, privately ordered enhanced fiduciary duties and
broader corporate purposes similar to those listed in the Benefit
Corporations Article.2 7 Similarly, as alluded to in the commentary
to Pennsylvania's yet to be adopted benefit corporation statute,
any corporation, public or private, can include these sorts of pub-
lic purposes in its articles of incorporation or bylaws, and the di-
rectors would have a fiduciary duty to pursue those purposes.2 8
Virginia courts have clearly stated that Virginia corporations
may expand the fiduciary duties of directors beyond those re-
quired in the VSCA and the common law via contract or their
governing documents.29
B. Fiduciary Duties
Corporations electing to be benefit corporations in Virginia sig-
nificantly broaden the number of constituencies who are owed fi-
duciary duties by directors. In a typical solvent corporation, the
board of directors owes fiduciary duties to the corporation and to
the shareholders as a class, not to any individual shareholder or
minority or majority shareholders. 0 The duty owed to sharehold-
ers as a class seems to be primarily a duty of honesty and disclo-
sure.3 1 So, for the most part, for a solvent Virginia corporation
there is one constituency-the corporation itself. One of the at-
tractive aspects of Virginia's corporate code and the surrounding
body of case law is that this simplicity-taking into account the
best interests of the corporation in its subjective good faith-
enables a board to focus on putting the corporation's pooled capi-
tal to use by taking risks calculated to enhance the value of that
capital. In contrast, the board of a benefit corporation will have to
27. Id. § 13.1-671.1 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
28. Id. § 13.1-626 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
29. Remora Invs., L.L.C. v. Orr, 277 Va. 316, 324, 673 S.E.2d 845, 848 (2009) (citing
Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666 (Va. 2001)); see also Proposed Pennsylvania Act, supra
note 2.
30. Remora Invs., 277 Va. at 323-24, 673 S.E.2d at 848 (quoting Am. Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 741 (E.D. Va. 1980)).
31. See, e.g., Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 215 Va. 782, 789, 213 S.E.2d 774, 779 (1975).
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consider, and presumably will have fiduciary duties to, share-
holders, employees, suppliers, customers, the community and so-
ciety, the local and global environment, the short-term and long-
term interests of the benefit corporation, and the ability of the
corporation to accomplish its general and specific public purpos-
es.32 It is important to note that while only the benefit corporation
itself-the directors, the shareholders, and other persons named
in the articles-will have a right to actually enforce these du-
ties,3 the broader set of duties still leaves many more ways to
challenge any given corporate action. Even a benefit corporation
that elects to include no specific public benefit in its articles of in-
corporation or bylaws must deliver "a material positive impact on
society and the environment taken as a whole, as measured by a
third-party standard."34 B Lab is a not-for-profit organization that
has positioned itself as a third party to certify compliance with a
benefit corporation's general public benefit purposes. 35 As B Lab
notes in its Legal Provision and FAQs about benefit corporations,
these concepts will remain undefined until courts begin interpret-
ing exactly what is meant by general and specific duties.3 6 At this
juncture, it would be unwise for any practitioner to advise his or
her client with any certainty on exactly what these sweeping du-
ties require, or for any social entrepreneur adopting benefit cor-
poration status to accept without question advice from legal coun-
sel about what they must do to discharge their duties.
The virtue of a simple mission-the best interest of the corpo-
ration-is that it can be executed well. When given so many dif-
ferent objectives, the board of a benefit corporation may in fact
have a difficult time accomplishing any of them well.
C. Limitation of Liability
The limitation of liability for directors in the Benefit Corpora-
tions Article is helpful because it makes clear that directors can-
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
33. Id. § 13.1-790 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
34. Id. §§ 13.1-782, 13.1-787 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
35. See generally B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/about (last visited Oct. 12,
2011); see also Tozzi, supra note 11.
36. Benefit Corporation-Legal Provisions and FAQs, B LAB [hereinafter Benefit Corp.
FAQS], http://www.bcorporation.net/resources/bcorp/documents/Benelt%/o20Corporation%
20-%2oLegal%2OProvisions%20and%20FAQ.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
492011]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
not be held liable for failing to achieve any general or specific
public benefit." It would be quite daunting for directors to prove
the benefit corporation had achieved a general public benefit as
this could mean a sweeping set of duties difficult to quantify and
measure. This limitation of liability may help benefit corporations
find qualified persons to serve on their board.
However, it is not clear how new sections 13.1-788(C) and 13.1-
789 of the Benefit Corporations Article are intended to interact
with section 13.1-692.1 of the VSCA. 3 8 Are sections 13.1-788(C)
and 13.1-789 the maximum elimination of liability for directors
and officers, respectively? Can a benefit corporation eliminate all
liability of directors or officers other than willful misconduct or a
knowing violation of criminal law or of any federal or state securi-
ties law under section 13.1-692.1 of the VSCA? Do sections 13.1-
788(C) and 13.1-789 of the Benefit Corporations Article only cover
a benefit enforcement proceeding under the Benefit Corporations
Article with an elimination of liability under section 13.1-692.1 of
the VSCA applying in all other cases?
In addition, the separate limitation of liability for officers in
the Benefit Corporations Article holds officers to a much higher
standard than directors.3 9 The officer limitation of liability seems
to suffer from a misunderstanding of the board's role in corporate
governance and setting policy, the officer's role in execution of
those policies, and the board and officer's relative responsibilities
for those policies, particularly in Virginia.4 0 Without specifically
calling it a standard of conduct, it imports a subjective good faith
business judgment standard as a condition precedent to officer
exculpation.4 1 Of course, no statutory standard of conduct for of-
ficers of non-benefit corporations exists in Virginia. Under the
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
38. See id. §§ 13.1-692.1, -788(C), -789 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
39. See id. §§ 13.1-788 to -789 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
40. Even in Delaware following Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009), officers
are only held to the same, not a greater standard, than directors. Yes, some commentators
have suggested that the business judgment rule should not apply to officers. See Lyman
P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus. LAw 439, 440
(2005). However, this is not the rule in Virginia. In addition, Virginia provides for more
favorable indemnification for officers than Delaware. Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-698,
-704(B), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §145. Unlike Delaware, Virginia allows for exculpa-
tion of officers. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7).
41. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-789 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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Benefit Corporations Article, the board of a benefit corporation
could not have liability for adopting policies that fail to achieve
its purported general or specific public benefits." Meanwhile, the
officers could be held liable if they did not believe in their subjec-
tive good faith business judgment that executing the policies was
consistent with the public benefit.4 3 In addition, if the board of di-
rectors of a Virginia benefit corporation adopts a policy that is in-
consistent with the third-party standard the board has adopted in
a proceeding arising from that decision, the board of directors
would seem to have no liability.4 4 The officers, however, would
have liability if, while executing the board's decision, they did not
believe in the board's subjective good faith that the corporation's
actions were consistent with the third-party standard."
As a result, for each decision a prudent officer of a benefit cor-
poration executes, he must make his own separate determination
of whether he believes in his good faith business judgment that
the decision will further the extremely broad general or specific
public benefits and whether or not the decision complies with the
applicable third-party standard. Presumably, if the officer disa-
grees with the board's decision and cannot change the board's
mind, his only choice is to resign or face personal liability. Grant-
ed, boards rely on officers to inform their decisions, and officers
often make routine decisions without consulting the board. How-
ever, it is the board, not the officers, that exercises its good faith
business judgment and makes the ultimate strategic decisions in
a Virginia corporation.4 6 The Benefit Corporations Article has not
transferred the board's authority to the officers, but it has created
an odd separation with the board having the broad authority and
officers having the broad accountability. While some degree of ac-
countability for decisions made without consulting the board
might be appropriate, the reformulation of the relationship be-
tween officers and directors in the Benefit Corporations Article is
a significant departure from Virginia's approach to officer liability
under section 13.1-692.1 of the VSCA, where the liability of both
directors and officers can be eliminated to the same extent.47 Per-
42. Id. § 13.1-788(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
43. Id. § 13.1-789 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
44. Id. § 13.1-788(C) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
45. Id. § 13.1-789 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
46. Id. § 13.1-673(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
47. Id. § 13.1-692.1 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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sons contemplating accepting a role as an officer in a benefit cor-
poration, boards of directors, and even D&O insurers for benefits
corporations should be mindful of these issues.
D. Benefit Enforcement Proceedings
Presumably for a derivative benefit enforcement proceeding,
the process and procedures under the balance of the VSCA would
apply.48 However, that determination is not absolutely clear. Both
provisions address standing to bring a derivative claim. The Ben-
efit Corporations Article expands the list of persons who have
standing to bring a derivative action,4 9 but it does not make clear
that a benefit enforcement proceeding is to be brought in the
manner described in section 13.1-672.1(B) of the VSCA, which re-
lates only to shareholder proceedings. It is also unclear that an
enforcement proceeding may be dismissed following a review,
evaluation, and vote by the disinterested directors as provided in
sections 13.1-672.4(A) and 13.1-671.4(B) of the VSCA."0
E. Third-Party Standard
The benefit corporation's obligation to measure itself against a
third-party standard may or may not be problematic. For exam-
ple, in the accounting context, the United States Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principals ("GAAP") might be considered a
standard developed by an independent party, and one that is suf-
ficiently transparent because it is publicly available." While no
standard, including GAAP, is perfect, it goes without saying that
GAAP has certainly helped corporations pool and deploy capital,
because it provides financial statement users with a commonly
understood and relatively uniform methodology for presenting fi-
nancial information to investors.
48. Id. §§ 13.1-672.1 to -672.6 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
49. Compare id. § 13.1-790(B) (Repl. Vol. 2011), with id. § 13.1-692.1(A) (Repl. Vol.
2011). This is true given that the articles of incorporation or bylaws may add non-
shareholders or non-directors to the list of persons with standing. It is also not clear that
an individual director has standing to bring a derivative action in Virginia. In fact, section
13.1-672.1 would appear to limit standing to bring a derivative action to shareholders.
50. Compare id. § 13.1-790 (Repl. Vol. 2011), with id. § 13.1-672.4(A)-(B) (Repl. Vol.
2011).
51. For the definition of "third-party standard," see id. § 13.1-782 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
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Unlike GAAP, no clear third-party standard exists for measur-
ing and reporting general or specific public benefits.5 ' Because of
this lack of definition, until a relatively uniform standard devel-
ops, a benefit corporation may have difficulty in benchmarking its
progress toward general and specific public benefits. At least at
this point, unlike certified public accountants, the persons who
formulate these third-party standards are not necessarily subject
to rigorous professional training and certification.5 3 This is not a
fatal flaw; it is more a function of the newness of the concept of a
benefit corporation. Nevertheless, this increases the likelihood
that these standards will evolve and vary between different third-
party standard developers. The third-party standard developers
also do not necessarily have the interests of individual benefit
corporations in mind. As a benefit corporation sees its third-party
standard evolve, it may feel pressure to conform to that standard
even when conforming does not suit its particular mission. Fur-
ther, officers who have to weigh the third-party standard against
their decisions, as well as weigh potential liability for their deci-
sions, will have an interest in adopting the least exacting third-
party standard.5 4 Both the officers and the corporation may have
difficulty in adjusting to standards that change from year to year.
F. Benefit Report
As mentioned above, third-party standards are nascent and
will evolve. Because the benefit report requires a benefit corpora-
tion to report on its progress as measured by such third-party
standards," it may be difficult for a benefit corporation to develop
and implement proper metrics along with a reporting system to
timely generate benefit reports. Finally, for any benefit corpora-
tions that happen to be public companies, the benefit report will
presumably be material, and as such, to avoid securities fraud li-
ability, the benefit report must not make any untrue or mislead-
ing statements of material fact." Even though a benefit corpora-
tion will apply third-party standards, because these standards
52. See Benefit Corp. FAQS, supra note 36.
53. See Who Certifies?, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/index.cfm/fuseaction/con
tent.page/nodelD/08c9dc4d-6064-84cb-afO4-4fd9d4cedO55/externalURL// (last visited Oct.
12, 2011).
54. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-789 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
55. Id. § 13.1-791(A)(2)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010).
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are not yet uniform and the concepts of general public benefit and
specific public benefit could be subjective and difficult to meas-
ure,5 7 public benefit corporations will need to be exceedingly care-
ful in avoiding potential securities fraud liability for disclosures
in their benefit reports.
IV. Do BENEFIT CORPORATIONS ADD ANYTHING THAT CANNOT BE
ACHIEVED VIA PRIVATE ORDERING IN VIRGINIA?
Many reasons exist to commend the benefit corporation concept
and its brave attempt to help define the best interests of a corpo-
ration in a broader light. Any attempt to help business entities
take into account social costs or internalize negative externalities
is a noble endeavor." The concept of harnessing the power of cap-
italism to achieve positive social objectives is also very appealing.
However, social entrepreneurs and practitioners in Virginia who
hope to form entities that take the society, the environment, and
other public benefits into account, should carefully consider
whether: (1) electing to be a benefit corporation under the Benefit
Corporations Article, or (2) electing to privately order their corpo-
ration to pursue noble objectives is the better path.
Two aspects of the Benefit Corporations Article: (1) a broader
fiduciary duty, and (2) the option to adopt, via the Benefit Corpo-
rations Article, broader public purposes, would seem to best cap-
ture the reason for creating the separate benefit corporation
class."
Maryland was the first state to pass a benefit corporation stat-
ute. Its sponsor, Maryland State Senator and American Universi-
ty Law Professor Jamie Raskin, authored an article on why bene-
fit corporations are needed."o Professor Raskin cites two
justifications for the need to specifically authorize directors to
consider matters beyond profit maximization: (1) the duties in
Delaware to maximize the purchase price paid to shareholders in
the change of control context announced in Revlon, Inc. v.
57. See supra Part III.E.
58. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 42-
44 (1960).
59. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-787 to -788 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
60. Raskin, supra note 2.
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MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.; and (2) the "enhanced
scrutiny" applied to director decisions in the takeover context un-
der Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.62 However, neither the
Revlon nor the Unocal standards apply in Virginia." No positive
law exists in Virginia suggesting that a director need consider
anything other than what he believes in his subjective good faith
to be in the best interests of the corporation. That consideration
most assuredly includes earning a profit, but it does not neces-
sarily exclude other considerations that might also be in the best
interests of the corporation. Further, under section 13.1-671.1 of
the VSCA, private corporations could previously, and may still
adopt in their articles, bylaws, or in a shareholder agreement,
privately ordered enhanced fiduciary duties and broader corpo-
rate purposes.64
Similarly, as alluded to in the commentary to Pennsylvania's
yet to be adopted benefit corporation statute, any corporation,
public or private, can include general or specific public purposes
in its articles of incorporation or bylaws, and the directors would
have a fiduciary duty to pursue those purposes." If a Virginia
corporation so desires, it could accomplish results similar to those
under the Benefit Corporations Article by including a privately
ordered purpose in its articles of incorporation such as "improving
human health in Richmond, Virginia by operating a for-profit
hospital system." This provision alone would expand the direc-
tor's fiduciary duties to include the pursuit of that purpose, but
the corporation could also tailor those duties as it sees fit without
incorporating the seemingly broad duties included in the Benefit
Corporations Article.
In addition to limiting its ability to create only the intended
public purposes and fiduciary duties via private ordering, a cor-
poration that elects to be a benefit corporation also subjects itself
to unclear exculpation provisions that, especially as it relates to
61. 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
62. 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985).
63. See WLR Foods, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 65 F.3d 1172, 1182-83 (4th Cir. 1995)
(applying Virginia law and declining to adopt the Unocal standard in the takeover con-
text); Willard v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, 258 Va. 140, 151, 515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (1999) (reject-
ing Revlon duties in Virginia).
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-671.1 (Repl. Vol. 2011).
65. See Proposed Pennsylvania Act, supra note 2, § 3311 cmt., at 11.
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officers, could significantly increase their liability.6 6 Further, of-
ficers will be subjected to an explicit good faith business judgment
standard of conduct as a condition precedent to their exculpa-
tion. In contrast, Virginia non-benefit corporations are free to
craft privately ordered indemnification and exculpation provi-
sions that take the achievement of any lawful business purpose
into account, while avoiding the broader concept of creating "a
material positive impact on society and the environment taken as
a whole." This may be much more difficult to achieve, quantify,
measure, and most importantly, defend in a derivative action.8
While each benefit corporation will be free to select its third-
party standard for assessing its general public benefit and specif-
ic public benefits, each corporation is also free to do this without
electing to be treated as a benefit corporation. While this outcome
might be less than ideal, a corporation that privately orders its
own public purpose and corresponding fiduciary duties could also
achieve some of the marketing benefit of being designated a "ben-
efit corporation" by voluntarily complying with a third-party
standard, like that of B Lab, without actually electing to be treat-
ed as a benefit corporation under the Benefit Corporations Arti-
cle.69
For any public corporation, privately ordered business purpose
standards of conduct and exculpation provisions may be more ap-
pealing than electing to be treated as a benefit corporation and
incurring the obligation to provide a benefit report that may sub-
ject the company to liability under securities laws.
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND OBSERVATIONS
Undoubtedly, for some social entrepreneurs, the benefit corpo-
ration created under the Benefit Corporations Article will be the
right choice. However, this decision should be made with a full
66. See supra Part III. C.
67. Id.
68. Benefit Corp. FAQS, supra note 36.
69. Professor Raskin cites the marketing opportunities as a benefit of electing to be
treated as a benefit corporation. Raskin, supra note 2. B LAB also cites concerns about so-
called -green washing"-marketing products as green but not necessarily following green
practices, but will certify companies to help bolster their green credentials. See Peter Van
Allen, Third-Party Certification Combats 'Greenwashing,' PHILADELPHIA BUS. J., June 9,
2008, http://www.bizjournals.com/philadelphia/stories/2008/06/09/focus4.html.
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understanding of the broader corporate purposes and fiduciary
duties. Additionally, issues related to exculpation, the selection of
third-party standards, unanswered questions with respect to de-
rivative claims, and issues related to the preparation of benefit
reports remain unclear. For some social entrepreneurs, and per-
haps public companies especially, a privately ordered Virginia
corporation that selects some of the concepts of the Benefit Cor-
porations Article on an a-la-carte basis may be the preferred
route.
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